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Abstract 
The last twenty years have witnessed the diffusion of regional innovation policies 
supporting networks of innovators. The underlying aim of these policies is to 
encourage firms, particularly SMEs, to undertake collaborations with organisations 
possessing complementary knowledge. Focusing on a set of SMEs that have 
participated, over time, in several innovation networks funded by the same regional 
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government, the paper investigates how their relationships have evolved with respect 
to the following aspects: (i) reiteration of pre-existing relationships as opposed to 
experimentation of new relationships; (ii) collaboration with organisations possessing 
complementary rather than similar knowledge and competencies; (iii) creation of 
local relationships rather than experimentation of extra-local collaborations; (iv) 
reliance upon intermediaries to connect with other organisations. Our findings reveal 
that the involvement in these policy-supported networks changed the firms’ relational 
patterns, leading them to collaborate with a wider variety of agents than those with 
whom they were linked before the policies. Sectoral heterogeneity had a negative 
effect on the probability to collaborate, while co-localisation increased the likelihood 
to collaborate. Mutual involvement with intermediaries also had a positive effect. 
However, in the case of firm-to-university relationships only specialized 
intermediaries were likely to perform a positive role and, therefore, encourage 
networking. 
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1. Introduction 
The last twenty years have witnessed the diffusion of regional innovation policies 
that support networking among heterogeneous organisations (e.g.: firms and 
universities; small and large firms). Examples include policies inspired by the 
concepts of regional innovation system or innovation cluster (Asheim et al. 2003; 
Cooke et al., 2004; OECD 2007, 2010, 2011; Asheim et al., 2011; Lagendijk, 2011) 
and, in recent times, the smart specialization strategies launched by the European 
Union (Foray et al., 2012).  
In these contexts, networks among heterogeneous organisations are seen as tools to 
enhance and exploit the complementarities between agents with different knowledge 
and competencies (Hagedoorn, 1993), between different sources of knowledge and 
skills in the region (Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Cooke, 2007; Lazzeretti et al., 2010; 
Asheim et al., 2011; Boschma and Frenken, 2011; Foray et al., 2012) or between local 
and extra-local knowledge (Trippl et al., 2009; Dettman et al., 2012).   
The implicit assumption is that policies are needed to stimulate interactions that 
would not occur spontaneously, but whose presence would be desirable (Carlsson and 
Jacobsson, 1997; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). Interactions between SMEs and 
universities are a typical example, but there are many other cases of collaborations 
between firms that could be mutually beneficial, but are not easily realized. SMEs, 
which are equipped with relatively low internal resources, are most likely to benefit 
from collaborations with external agents. However, as in the “innovation paradox” 
defined by Oughton et al. (2002), SMEs are often the most reluctant to build 
relationships with universities or other agents. This creates a problem for 
policymakers who want to stimulate innovation and the upgrading of SMEs’ skills, 
especially those which are lagging behind. The problem for the policymaker can be 
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summarized as follows. First, the basic issue is how to induce the targeted 
organisations to participate in policies aimed at supporting networking. In fact, the 
same reasons that may prevent firms, particularly SMEs, from innovating or that 
leave them in a competence lock-in trap, may also constitute barriers to their 
participation in the policies (Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1991). Second, once firms 
have been involved in these networks, they may only perform a peripheral role, 
failing to achieve more than temporary benefits from the experience. In fact, the 
collaborative behaviour can be changed only if the organisations involved have the 
time to get to know the different partners and to learn how to work together. Third, 
even if they decide to play an active role, firms could simply use the public grant to 
fund the activities carried out with their already tried and tested partners, and in this 
way fail to benefit from the many learning opportunities offered by the policy 
intervention, when it provides incentives to experiment with new forms of 
collaboration. 
What can be done to overcome these problems? Since it would not be possible, nor 
appropriate, to identify the specific partners with whom an organisation should 
collaborate, what policies can do is provide incentives in order to encourage 
collaboration among heterogeneous organisations (also through the use of 
“intermediaries”, see Howells, 2006), establish a general framework of rules and then 
leave the participants free to organise their innovative activity. However, the presence 
of general and flexible incentives does not ensure that undesirable behaviours (such as 
peripheral involvement of firms, limited heterogeneity of collaborations or repeated 
interactions among the same organisations and closure to outsiders) are not adopted 
anyway.  
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Our study explores how these issues have played out within a set of policy 
interventions promoting innovative projects carried out by networks of heterogeneous 
organisations, which have been implemented by the regional government of Tuscany 
(Italy) in the programming period 2000-2006.  
In particular, we focus on the set of SMEs that have displayed repeated 
involvement in these policy-funded networks, and we investigate how their 
relationships have evolved according to several aspects: (i) reiteration of pre-existing 
linkages as opposed to experimentation of new relationships (stability); (ii) 
collaboration with agents possessing complementary rather than similar knowledge 
and competencies or abilities (degree of heterogeneity among agents); (iii) 
development of intra-cluster relationships rather than creation of extra-local 
collaborations (local relations); (iv) reliance upon intermediaries in order to connect 
with other agents (intermediaries). 
Our analysis does not take into account the period after the end of the policy, nor 
the behaviour of any counterfactual sample of firms. Therefore, it cannot be 
considered a program evaluation exercise. Instead, we seek to contribute to the 
analysis of innovation policies, and to the study of the behaviour of policy-supported 
networks over time. This literature has often focused on the analysis of large-scale 
projects (e.g. the European Union’s Framework Programmes) and it has often taken 
either the individual firm or the entire network as its unit of analysis (Breschi and 
Cusmano, 2004; Wagner and Leydesdorff, 2005; Barber et al., 2006; Cassi et al., 
2008). Our analysis focuses instead on small-scale policies that target SMEs, and 
takes the dyad (firm-to-firm, firm-to-university or firm-to-other agents) as the basic 
unit of analysis. By adopting this quite original perspective, we try to shed some light 
on the “black box” of the relational behaviour of agents within a policy.   
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the empirical 
literature on firms’ relational patterns in the context of policy-supported innovation 
networks, highlighting the four key aspects that are further investigated in this study. 
Section 3 describes the set of interventions implemented by Tuscany’s regional 
government, presenting the main features of the policy programmes and their 
objectives in the broader context of the region’s innovation policies. Section 4 
introduces the data and methodology. In section 5, we investigate empirically how 
firms’ participation in early-stage policy programmes affected their relational patterns 
in later programmes. Section 6 concludes by drawing some general implications for 
more effectively implementing, monitoring and evaluating policies in support of 
innovation networks. 
 
2. Relational patterns in the context of policy-supported innovation networks: 
four key aspects emerging from the literature  
In recent years, several empirical contributions have explored the issue of publicly-
funded collaborations for innovation (consortia, JVs, innovation networks). However, 
only a few of them have focused on the interactions among agents within policy-
supported networks in order to assess how these collaborations form and evolve, and 
what are their main drivers. These analyses are consistent with a behavioural 
additionality approach to policy analysis and evaluation (Buisseret et al, 1995), which 
focuses on the learning effects of a policy on the participants’ behaviour during and/or 
after the project’s implementation (Clarysse et al, 2009).  
Among the different aspects of agents’ relational behaviour that may be affected 
by network-based policies, several key themes have emerged as being particularly 
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worthy of attention: the stability of relations, the agents’ heterogeneity, the local 
dimension of relations, and the reliance upon intermediaries in order to connect with 
other organisations. According to an extensive literature on innovation, these four 
characteristics influence the innovative potential of interactions among organisations 
in a network. Moreover, as we will discuss more extensively in the next sections, 
these four aspects characterized the policies that we studied. In fact, the policies 
implemented in Tuscany in 2000-2006 displayed the following four features: i) the 
participants could develop repeated relationships; ii) the participants were required to 
set up heterogeneous partnerships; iii) the creation of extra-local (extra-cluster) 
relationships was encouraged, but only within the boundaries of the region; iv) 
intermediaries were involved in order to facilitate the creation of linkages between 
different partners. 
In the following we briefly review some theoretical and empirical contributions 
highlighting the relevance of these four themes. 
(i) Stability. Several contributions have stressed that in order to acquire and 
manipulate existing knowledge, as well as to produce new knowledge, the networked 
organisations should develop specific standards, skills and competencies, whose 
creation, in turn, requires non-transitory collaborations among the agents involved 
(Gulati, 1995; Powell et al., 1996; Nooteboom, 2000). At the same time, such 
collaborations should not become too stable, in order to avoid the risk of lock-ins 
(Lane and Maxfield, 1997; Nooteboom et al., 2007). For this reason, some authors 
have stressed that temporary networks, such as those emerging from the realization of 
a collaborative research project, are important in order to bring in new knowledge 
(Asheim, 2002; Grabher 2004). The empirical literature on policy-supported networks 
tells us that long-term policies, which allow repeated participations, may lead to the 
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formation of an oligarchic core of relatively stable collaborations, surrounded by a 
number of peripheral organisations. This has been observed by Breschi and Cusmano 
(2004) and Barber et al. (2006)  in the case of the European Union’s Framework 
Programmes, as well as by Russo and Rossi (2009) and Bellandi and Caloffi (2010) in 
the case of regional innovation policies. However, the existing contributions do not 
investigate to what extent this stability is the result of the innovative strategy of the 
agents involved. In addition, very few contributions explore whether those 
collaborations are created by the policies or are pre-existing. Among the few 
exceptions, we find Fier et al. (2006) who, in their analysis of an R&D collaboration 
programme implemented in Germany, showed that public policies stimulated agents 
to form brand new types of collaborations. Drawing on empirical results from Spain, 
Chávez (2011) found that regional policies were more effective than national ones in 
stimulating firms not previously engaged in R&D collaborations to establish new 
linkages with universities or technology centres. 
 (ii) Degree of heterogeneity among agents. Networks among agents that differ in 
nature, knowledge and competencies lead to various benefits in terms of information 
diffusion, resource sharing, access to specialized assets and inter-organisational 
learning (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Powell and Grodal, 2006). This is 
particularly important in highly innovative and technology intensive industries, where 
agents need to complement their internal resources and competencies with specialized 
knowledge, technologies and know-how (Ahuja, 2000). However, a high degree of 
heterogeneity may hamper mutual understanding or may not be effective in focusing 
agents’ interests and objectives (Lane and Maxfield, 1997; Sampson, 2007). As 
mentioned before, many innovation policy interventions around the world try to 
support the emergence of these complementarities. In their analysis of the European 
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Union’s Framework Programmes, Wagner and Leydesdorff’s (2005) found that these 
programmes have been successful in facilitating the creation of partnership among 
agents that belonged to different sectors. 
(iii) Local relations. A wide literature on clusters and on innovation has shown that 
the local environment may be home to important interactions for the generation of 
innovations, particularly in cases where tacit knowledge is relevant and in industries 
in which the knowledge base is mostly synthetic or symbolic (Asheim et al., 2007). 
However, the same literature has warned against the risks of localism, which can lead 
to cognitive lock-ins. Precisely for this reason, many policies around the world have 
sought to encourage firms in lagging-behind regions to break the circuit of local 
knowledge they are embedded in (Hassink, 2005; Tödtling and Trippl, 2005). The few 
empirical contributions addressing this issue show that regional innovation policies 
have been successful in stimulating the formation of extra-regional interactions 
(Antonioli et al., 2013).  
(iv) Intermediaries. The presence of intermediaries may be required to ensure 
interaction and communication among heterogeneous participants (and groups of 
participants), which differ in knowledge, language, systems of incentives and 
objectives, etc. (Hassink, 1996, 1997; Howells, 2006). Intermediaries can have 
different nature. They may be specialized in technology transfer (from academia to 
industry), or they can play a wider range of functions, ranging from information 
diffusion to networking support and (indirect) technology transfer (Hassink, 1996). 
Obviously, the most dynamic firms that are able to have a direct relationship with the 
university will also be able to link to the former type of intermediaries (which are 
often directly participated by the university). On the contrary, lagging-behind firms 
may find it difficult to set up relationships even with the technology transfer centers 
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(see Hassink, 1996, 1997). This is why some policies, such as those that we analyse in 
this study, envision a role for the latter type of intermediaries. Previous empirical 
evidence on innovation networks funded within some European Union programmes 
found that the former type of intermediaries (including innovative firms) are able to 
bridge research and diffusion networks, while other types of intermediaries are able to 
connect peripheral agents with those at the center of the network (Cassi et al., 2008).  
The analyses we have mentioned so far have focused either on the whole network 
of relationships between the organisations involved in the policy interventions, or on 
the individual organisations that participated in them, or both. In what follows we 
consider instead dyadic relationships between participants as the main unit of 
analysis. We try to identify which pairs of organisations, one of which is a firm, are 
more likely to form a relationship in the context of a policy programme in support of 
innovation networks, having already participated in the same kind of policy 
programmes in the past. This allows us to identify what aspects of firms’ involvement 
in policy-funded networks makes them more likely to collaborate in subsequent 
networks. 
 
3. Tuscany’s regional policy in support of innovation networks 
3.1 General features of programmes and participants 
Our analysis focuses on a set of policies supporting networks of innovators 
implemented by the regional government of Tuscany, mostly in the context of the 
regional Single Programming Document 2000-2006 (hereafter: SPD). Tuscany’s 
regional government has been one of the most active promoters of innovation network 
policies in Italy, with a succession of tenders supported by the European Regional 
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Development Fund (ERDF) since the early 2000s (Russo and Rossi, 2009; Bellandi 
and Caloffi, 2010). In particular, in the programming period 2000-2006 it promoted a 
set of nine programmes aimed at supporting innovative projects carried out by 
networks of heterogeneous economic agents
1
. These policies were addressed to a 
regional economic context characterized by a prevalence of SMEs that did not 
perform R&D activity; many of these firms operated in low or medium technology 
sectors affected by harsh international competition. Spontaneous networking among 
local firms was limited to those active in the industrial clusters of the region 
(Becattini, 2003; Dei Ottati, 2004), and networking among firms (SMEs in particular) 
and universities or public research centres was particularly weak (Caloffi and 
Mariani, 2011). In order to support the upgrading of these firms’ innovation skills, the 
regional government funded collaborative innovation projects – that is, innovation 
networks – among micro enterprises, SMEs, large firms, universities, research 
centres, business services providers and other organisations acting as intermediaries.  
Although funded with resources from the 2000-2006 programming period, the 
programmes actually ran between 2002 and 2008. In particular, the set of policy 
programmes can be divided into two main periods. The first period ran from 2002 to 
2005 and included six programmes: a Regional Programme of Innovative Actions 
launched in 2002 (“Technological Innovation in Tuscany”) and five programmes 
funded by two lines of the regional SPD (lines 171 and 172) launched in 2002, 2004 
and in 2005. In the policymakers’ intentions, these programmes would have led to the 
development and strengthening of innovation networks composed of SMEs and large 
companies working together with universities, innovation service providers and other 
organisations supporting innovation and local development (we call this the “network 
formation” stage). Strongly inspired by the regional innovation system framework, 
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the regional policymaker considered the emergence of such clusters as the first step 
towards the formation of Tuscany’s innovation system. The programmes in the first 
period imposed a number of constraints in terms of size and composition of the 
project partnership, which will be described in detail in the following section 3.2.    
The second period started in 2006, and ended with the last intervention 
implemented in 2008. It included three programmes: a second RPIA, launched in 
2006 (“Virtual Innovation and Cooperative Integration”), and two waves of the SPD, 
line 171, launched in 2007 and 2008. Interestingly, the interventions implemented in 
the second period (almost 65% of the overall budget) had not been planned at the 
beginning of the programming period
2
. Rather, they were launched thanks to the 
availability of residual funds and premiums allocated by the European Union to the 
region. Since the policymaker’s goal with these additional programmes was to 
consolidate the networks formed in the previous period, we call this the “network 
consolidation” stage. In this stage, all the constraints that were previously imposed on 
the size and composition of the project partnerships were removed. 
Through the nine programmes, Tuscany’s regional government funded 168 
innovation networks (79 in the first and 89 in the second period), corresponding to an 
overall funding allocation of  almost € 37 million (this amounted to around 40% of 
the total funds spent on innovation policies in the region in the observed programming 
period). In our analysis we shall consider only these funded networks. 
The total amount of different organisations involved in the nine programmes was 
1,127, a subset of which (205) had taken part in projects in both periods
3
. Instead, 651 
organisations only participated in networks in the first period and 271 only 
participated in the second (table 1). Firms represented 35.6% of the organisations 
involved in both periods, but much higher shares of the organisations involved in only 
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one period. That is: most of the firms exhibited a transitory participation in the policy 
programmes (one year and one network on average).  
 
Table 1. Participants by type of organisation 
 Type of organisation Only 2002-5 Only 2006-8 Both periods 
  n. % n. % n. % 
Firm  417 64.1% 190 70.1% 73 35.6% 
University  44 6.8% 21 7.7% 28 13.7% 
Private research company  12 1.8% 6 2.2% 4 2.0% 
Service centre  14 2.2% 3 1.1% 18 8.8% 
Business service provider  42 6.5% 23 8.5% 21 10.2% 
Local government  49 7.5% 10 3.7% 18 8.8% 
Local association  51 7.8% 10 3.7% 24 11.7% 
Chamber of commerce  0 0.0% 1 0.4% 10 4.9% 
Other public body  22 3.4% 7 2.6% 9 4.4% 
Total 651 100.0% 271 100.0% 205 100.0% 
Note to table 1: The category “firms” include manufacturing firms and software developers. The 
category “university” includes universities and public research centres, while the third category 
includes private research companies. Service centres are publicly funded (or funded via public-private 
partnerships) agents providing a wide range of innovation-related services, while business service 
providers are private companies providing design, marketing, business consultancy and other services 
to firms included in the first category. Local associations are business associations and other types of 
association among firms. The last category, “other public bodies” includes other public agents such as, 
for instance, hospitals and medical clinics.    
 
3.2. The main policy requirements 
The policy programmes were characterized by some particular features, some of 
which were binding in nature: 
i) Stability: Repeated participation was admitted across the various programmes. It 
was seen as a means to facilitate the formation of relatively stable networks that could 
become the core of a future regional innovation system.  
ii) Heterogeneity: Programmes launched between 2002 and 2005 required the 
inolvement of a minimum number of specific kinds of organisations (firms and/or 
universities, service centers, local governments or other agents). In addition to 
imposing constraints, policymakers encouraged the formation of heterogeneous 
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partnerships through a number of “softer” activities, such as giving public speeches or 
circulating policy documents that highlighted the need to re-combine different 
knowledge and skills of regional agents in order to promote innovation. Networks 
were seen as powerful tools to promote the rebalancing of the disparities among 
regional organisations having different innovation propensity and different 
capabilities to invest in R&D, or organisations operating in different sectors or in 
different geographical areas of the region.  
iii) Local relations: the programmes encouraged the development of extra-cluster 
and intra-regional relationships. Agents localised outside the region could participate 
in the programmes, but they were not eligible for funding.  
iv) Presence of intermediaries: This was required in many programmes as a 
fundamental component of the networks. Such agents (not only KIBS, but also 
Chambers of Commerce and local business associations) were intended to play a 
bridging role among organisations endowed with different knowledge, skills and 
abilities, and to facilitate learning and innovation processes within the innovation 
networks.  
The interventions were characterized by a strong potential for learning on the part 
of the participating organisations. Particularly until 2006, participants to funded 
networks were regularly invited to present their progress in programme meetings. In 
addition to monitoring the networks’ progress, and to teach the policy participants 
how to manage the different aspects of the projects, these meetings served to 
strengthen networking and facilitate the circulation of information. In fact, the regular 
meetings (approximately one every four months) were used to exchange information 
on the innovative skills possessed by the various participants, the technologies 
developed and used in the projects, the sector of application of such technologies. The 
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participation of all the network participants – not just the leader – was highly 
recommended. Moreover, in order to maximize the diffusion of information, the 
regional government funded the publication of the final reports of the activities of 
each innovation network, to be distributed to participants in the various programmes 
and in public events. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
In order to build the database of dyadic relationships we have adopted the 
following procedure. First, we have selected the pairs of organisations participating in 
the same programmes (not simply in the same network) both in the network formation 
and in the network consolidation stages. Then, we have mapped both the “actual” and 
the “potential” relationships developing among them, keeping only the firm-to-firm, 
firm-to-university, or firm-to-other organisation (local governments, other public 
bodies, business associations, etc) dyads. As for actual relationships, we have 
considered the co-participations in the same innovation network. The potential 
relationships are those that could have developed among organisations that had 
participated in the same programme, but that did not realize because they participated 
in different networks
4
. In so doing, we obtained a database made of 6,391 dyads 
composed of organisations that had at least a potential relationships both in the 
network formation and in the network consolidation stage. Each record of our 
database is a dyad that includes a firm (always the first node of the dyad) and another 
organisation (including firms)
5
. As we see from table 2, 378 out of the 6,391 dyads 
actually occurred in the second period, while the remaining were only-potential 
relationships (i.e. relationships that did not realize). Table 3 provides some details on 
the 73 firms (manufacturing firms and software developers) and 131 other 
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organisations involved in the 6,391 dyads
6
. Almost all the observed firms were SMEs 
(70 out of 73). 
 
 
Table 2 – The actual and only potential dyads 
 Network consolidation (time t) 
Network 
formation 
(time t-1) 
  Actual Only potential  Total  
Actual 229 353 582 
Only potential 149 5,660 5,809 
Total 378 6,013 6,391 
 
Table 3 – The participants in the dyads 
Type of activity 
N. of 
organisations 
Manufacture of textiles, clothing and footwear 8 
Other “made in Italy” goods: furniture, jewellery, food 4 
Manufacture of chemical, rubber and plastic products 7 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 9 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 6 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 6 
Manufacture of medical devices 6 
Manufacture of motor vehicles and other transport equipment 3 
Manufacture of electrical equipment 3 
Other manufacturing firms 4 
Software developers & other activities related to informatics 17 
R&D services 14 
Professional, scientific and technical services 57 
Public administration 18 
Activities of membership organisations 12 
Cultural activities 3 
University departments 18 
Education and training 7 
Other 2 
TOTAL 204 
Note to table 3: In the category “firm” that we have used to build the dyads, we have included the 73 
agents that belong to the first 11 rows of the table (that is from manufacture of textiles to software 
developers). 
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Our dataset is based primarily on the administrative records held by the regional 
government that implemented the programme. In addition, we have performed a 
number of direct interviews to the policy participants during the intermediate or final 
evaluations of some of the observed programmes
7
. 
The following table 4 provides some descriptive statistics and a detailed 
description of the variables included in the database. The variable relation, measured 
on the total of 6,391 observed dyads, is a dummy variable taking value 1 when the 
relationship between the two agents realized during the second stage of network 
consolidation, and zero otherwise. 
.
 
The first group of independent variables provides some evidence on the history of 
collaborations between the members of the dyad, that is, on the stability of the dyad 
over time. The variable previous takes value 1 if the dyad co-participated to the same 
innovation network during the network formation stage (and zero if the relationship 
was only potential). The intensity of the previous relationship is measured by the 
variable multiple, which takes value 1 when the relationship was repeated more than 
once during the network formation stage (in different programmes, or in more 
projects of the same programme, when allowed by the policy). We also include some 
information referring to the period before the organisations took part in the policies: 
the variable prior takes the value 1 when the partners of the dyad had had a 
relationship before their participation to the policies
8
. Like for the other variables, a 
relationship exists when the two organisations co-participated in an innovation 
activity, whether spontaneously or thanks to policy incentives. The degree of 
heterogeneity between organisations is captured by a set of variables measuring the 
differences between them with respect to several criteria: i) the sectors in which they 
operate (sector_het); ii) their centrality in the network formation stage (power); iii) 
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their ability to lead a network (leader); iv) their ability to collect funds (funds) in the 
network formation stage.  
The first variable (sector_het) is a simple measure of sectoral heterogeneity. As 
described in table 4 below, we consider three degrees of sectoral heterogeneity: low, 
medium and high. Heterogeneity is low when the two organisations in the dyad 
belong to the same 3 digit Nace sector; it is medium when the two organisations 
operate in different 3 digit Nace sectors that are included in the same 2 digit Nace 
sector; it is high when the two organisations operate in different 2 digit Nace sectors.  
The variable power borrows some concepts from social network analysis, and in 
particular that of Bonacich centrality. To calculate the variable, we proceeded in the 
following way. First, considering the first period 2002-2005, we built a network in 
which two organisations are linked if they participated in the same innovation 
network(s). Then, we calculated the Bonacich centrality index at individual level, 
such that an agent is more central the higher the centrality indices of the agents in its 
neighbourhood (Bonacich, 1987). Finally, we defined the variable power as the 
difference (in absolute values) between the centrality indices of the two organisations 
in the dyad. 
The variable leader captures the organisations’ heterogeneity with respect to their 
skills in managing relationships, proxied by their capacity to be project leaders (the 
policy programmes required that each innovation network had a project leader): it is a 
dummy that takes value one when only one of the two organisations in the dyad had 
been project leader in at least one network in the first period.  
Finally the variable funds captures the organisations’ heterogeneity in their ability 
to successfully compete for public funds. It measures the difference (in absolute 
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values) in the amount of public funds received by the two organisations in the first 
period.    
The geographical dimension of the relationships is detected by a dummy variable,  
local, which takes value one when the dyad includes organisations that are localised 
in the same province, and zero otherwise.   
The presence of intermediaries is captured by a dummy variable (intermediaries) 
taking value one when the observed participants are indirectly linked through an 
intermediary, that is through an organisation which could be expected to perform an 
intermediation role (innovation centres and similar, private services providers, 
business associations and chamber of commerce). The two subsequent variables 
displayed in table 4 detail the nature of intermediaries. The variable sc focuses on 
innovation centres and similar organisations (incubators, technology parks and other 
service providers, often involving both public and private agents), that is on particular 
types of intermediaries that are supposed to play a prominent role in the context of 
innovation, while the variable other_int considers all the other types of intermediaries. 
All the independent variables mentioned so far are measured with respect to the 
network formation stage (at time t-1). 
The dataset also includes some control variables such as the specific policy 
programme in which the relationship formed or could have formed, given that both 
organisations participated in that programme. Moreover, since larger companies have 
generally a higher propensity to R&D collaboration (Hagedoorn, 2002; Belderbos et 
al, 2004), we have included a dummy that takes into account whether the dyad 
includes a large firm. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics on the potential and actual dyads linking organisations 
participating both in network formation and in network consolidation stages 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
relation  Dependent variable in model 1. Dummy 
variable taking value 1 when the 
relationship between the two 
organisations realizes during the 
consolidation stage (time t).  
6391 0.059 0.236 0 1 
Stability       
previous Dummy variable taking value 1 when 
the two organisations have had at least 
one relationship in t-1 
6391  0.091 0.288 0 1 
multiple Dummy variable taking value 1 when 
the two organisations have had multiple 
relationships in t-1 
6391  0.009 0.096 0 1 
prior Dummy variable taking value 1 when 
the two organisations have collaborated 
in an innovation activity before the 
beginning of the observed policies 
5903 0.006 0.081 0 1 
Heterogeneity       
sector_het Categorical variable measuring sectoral 
heterogeneity among the two 
organisations: 
     
 sector_het=LOW identifies the 
relationship linking two organisations 
operating in the same 3 digit Nace 
Rev.2  
6391  0.012  0.110 0 1 
sector_het=MEDIUM identifies the 
relationship linking two organisations 
operating in different 3 digit belonging 
to the same 2 digit Nace sector  
6391 0.01 0.1 0 1 
sector_het=HIGH identifies the 
relationship linking two organisations 
operating in different 2 digit Nace 
sectors 
6391 0.976 0.154 0 1 
power Difference (in absolute value) between 
the Bonacich  centrality indices of the 
two organisations, calculated in period 
t-1 
6391  41155.8 95037.85 .004 1749261 
leader Dummy variable taking value 1 when 
only one of the organisations has been 
leading partner of at least one project in 
period t-1 
6391  0.274 0.446 0 1 
funds Difference (in absolute value) between 
the amount of funds that have been 
collected by the two organisations in 
period t-1 
6391  51844.79 78275.26 0 391158 
Local dimension 
local Dummy variable taking value 1 when 
the two organisations are localised in 
the same province 
6391 0.173 0.378 0 1  
Intermediaries 
intermediaries Dummy variable taking value 1 when at 
t-1 the two organisations were indirectly 
connected through an intermediary 
(innovation centre, private services 
provider, business association or 
chamber of commerce) 
6391 0.484 0.5 0 1  
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sc Dummy variable equal to 1 when the 
two organisations at t-1 were indirectly 
connected through an innovation centre 
6391 0.215 0.411 0 1  
other_interm Dummy variable equal to 1 when the 
two organisations at t-1 were indirectly 
connected through an intermediary that 
was not an innovation centre 
6391 0.183 0.386 0 1  
Controls       
large_firm Dummy variable taking value 1 when 
the dyad includes (at least) one large 
firm 
6391 0.040 0.197 0 1 
2006_VIN Programme into which the two agents 
(might) have met:  
Programme: 2006_VIN 
6391 0.038 0.191 0 1 
2007_171 Programme: 2007_171 6391 0.577 0.494 0 1 
2008_171 Programme: 2008_171 6391 0.563 0.496 0 1 
 
 
We define a model that seeks to determine whether and to what extent the presence 
of previous relationships, the degree of heterogeneity, the local scale of the 
relationships, and the mutual connection to the same intermediaries in the first period 
are associated with a greater likelihood that, in the network consolidation stage, the 
organisations actually established a relationship. The dependent variable is the binary 
variable relation that takes value one when the members of the dyad had a 
relationship in the consolidation stage, and zero otherwise. The independent variables 
are as described above. After having checked that correlations among variables are 
sufficiently low, we run a logit regression model on the total number of dyads. In 
addition to this first model, we present other three models, which are run on different 
types of subpopulations. In particular, we disaggregate the analysis for different types 
of dyads, considering: i) firm-to-firm dyads;  ii) firm-to-university dyads; iii) firm-to-
other organisation dyads
9
. In addition to presenting a more detailed analysis for the 
type of organisations involved in the relationship, the models two to four differ from 
the first also because they discriminate between the types of intermediaries that 
indirectly linked the two organisations. We argue that while intermediaries having a 
broad and “political” mission (such as business associations or chambers of 
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commerce) can play an important role in creating connections between firms, more 
specialized organisations (such as innovation or service centres) may be more 
effective in creating connections between firms and universities. 
We hypothesize that, net of what we measure with the aforementioned covariates, 
the observed dyads are independent. However, as each organisation included in the 
database can be repeated several times, we adopt a specification of both models that 
uses the Huber-White sandwich estimators of the standard errors
10
.   
 
5. Results 
The following table 5 illustrates our results. The first model (table 5, column 2) 
explores the determinants of the likelihood to form a relationship in the network 
consolidation stage (relation). The results of the logistic regression suggest that the 
presence of a previous relationship in the network formation stage has a positive 
impact on the probability to form a new relationship in the network consolidation 
stage (previous), and this is particularly true when the previous relationship was 
strong (multiple). On the contrary, the presence of a relationship formed before the 
participation to the observed policies (prior) does not have any impact on the 
likelihood of collaborating in the network consolidation stage.  
In general, heterogeneity seems to play a negative role in fostering the formation of 
relationships during the consolidation stage. As for the sectoral heterogeneity, we 
observe that the probability to form a relationship in the network consolidation stage 
decreases as the distance among organisations increases. In fact, the coefficient 
associated with the maximum sectoral heterogeneity of the dyads – which is 
expressed in terms of the log odds – tells us that a one unit increase in sectoral 
heterogeneity results in a -1.9 unit change in the log of the odds. Also when measured 
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in terms of leadership capabilities, heterogeneity proves to have a negative impact on 
the probability to form a relationship in the second stage.  On the contrary, the 
relationships formed in the second period are more likely to involve dyads that are 
heterogeneous in terms of funds collected. Here heterogeneity seems to play a 
positive role: the variable funds tells us that the probability to form a relationship in 
the network consolidation stage increases as the differences in the organisations’ 
success in collecting funds increases.   
The variable local, identifying relationships developing at local level (very often 
intra-cluster relationships), has a positive influence on the probability to form a 
relationship in the second stage. Given that the observed region has a dense fabric of 
industrial clusters (Dei Ottati, 2004), it is not surprising to find that the local 
dimension of the relationships is important.  
The presence of intermediaries brokering the relationship at time t-1 has a positive 
influence on the formation of a new relationship in the stage of network 
consolidation. 
 
Table 5.  Regressions results  
 
Model 1 - all 
dyads 
Model 2 - firm-to-
firm dyads 
Model 3 - firm-to-
university dyads 
Model 4 - firm-to-
other agent dyads 
  obs=5903  obs=1121 obs=1085 obs=3697 
Variables Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   
  (s.e.)   (s.e.)   (s.e.)   (s.e.)   
y=relation 
        
cons -2.7586 *** -3.3579 *** -3.6896 *** -5.4583 *** 
 
(0.3873) 
 
(0.6638) 
 
(0.4436) 
 
(0.3906) 
 
previous 2.7235 *** 3.4663 *** 3.4060 *** 3.0425 *** 
 
(0.1620) 
 
(0.5543) 
 
(0.4981) 
 
(0.3087) 
 
multiple 3.5325 *** n.i. 
 
n.i. 
 
2.6548 *** 
 
(0.6765) 
     
(0.7483) 
 
prior 0.2553 
 
-0.6236 
 
0.0645 
 
1.1789 
 
 
(0.5043) 
 
(1.0662) 
 
(0.7680) 
 
(0.8077) 
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sector_het=MED -0.5287 
 
-0.7664 
 
n.i. 
 
n.i. 
 
 
(0.5088) 
 
(0.5828) 
     
sector_het=HIGH -1.8723 *** -1.5705 *** n.i. 
 
n.i. 
 
 
(0.3295) 
 
(0.3836) 
     
power 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
funds 0.0000 ** 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 ** 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
leader -0.5895 ** 0.1798 
 
-0.4338 
 
-0.5479 ** 
 
(0.1874) 
 
(0.8403) 
 
(0.3673) 
 
(0.2414) 
 
local 0.8209 *** 1.5544 *** 0.2677 
 
0.8931 *** 
 
(0.1454) 
 
(0.3225) 
 
(0.2742) 
 
(0.2070) 
 
intermediaries 0.3672 ** n.i. 
 
n.i. 
 
n.i. 
 
 
(0.1845) 
       
cs n.i. 
 
0.5940 
 
0.9991 * 0.3173 
 
   
(0.5417) 
 
(0.5373) 
 
(0.3622) 
 
other_interm n.i. 
 
0.1594 
 
-0.9665 * 0.5438 
 
   
(0.5182) 
 
(0.5090) 
 
(0.3633) 
 
2006_VIN 0.5274 
 
n.i. 
 
n.i. 
 
1.4558 
 
 
(0.3974) 
     
(0.4811) 
 
2007_171 0.3276 * 0.5827 
 
0.2582 
 
0.6320 
 
 
(0.1891) 
 
(0.4557) 
 
(0.3168) 
 
(0.2668) 
 
2008_171 0.6267 *** 0.8444 * 1.0325 ** 0.6186 
 
 
(0.1898) 
 
(0.4774) 
 
(0.3311) 
 
(0.2594) 
 
large_firm 0.3009 
 
-0.3541 
 
0.1542 
 
0.6682 
 
  (0.3966)   (0.6635)   (0.7470)   (0.6884)   
Note to table 5: Robust standard errors are in brackets. Significance levels: *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%. 
Model 1: Log pseudolikelihood = -872.8719; Wald Chi-Square test(14) = 647.58; pseudo R2 = 0.3274; n.i. stands 
for variable not included in the model.  
Model 2: Log pseudolikelihood = -187.66398; Wald  Chi-Square test (13) = 211.42; pseudo R2 = 0.3603.  
Model 3: Log pseudolikelihood = -239.89318; Wald Chi-Square test (11) = 135.83; pseudo R2 = 0.2206. 
Model 4: Log pseudolikelihood = - -432.87431; Wald Chi-Square test (13) = 501.18; pseudo R2 = 0.3666.  
The variables multiple and 2006_VIN are excluded in models 2and 3 because they predict failures /successes 
perfectly. Models 3 and 4 do not include the categorical variable measuring sectoral heterogeneity, because the 
latter largely overlaps with the definition of the nature of the agents involved. N.i. stands for variable not included 
in the model. 
 
 
In the second to fourth models (table 5, columns 3-5) we disaggregate the analysis, 
considering firm-to-firm, firm-to-university and firm-to-others dyads (relation_D). 
The dependent variable is always the presence (absence) of a relationship linking two 
organisations in the network consolidation stage.  
As in model 1, relationships that occurred before the beginning of the observed 
policies (prior) do not have any influence on the formation of subsequent 
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relationships in the network consolidation stage, while having had a relationship in 
the network formation stage has a positive effect on the probability to form a new 
relationship in the network consolidation stage, and this happens for all the observed 
types of dyads. Organisations that collaborate in more than one project during the 
network formation stage are likely to continue their collaboration also in the second 
stage
11
.     
The observation of firm-to-firm dyads confirms that sectoral heterogeneity plays a 
negative role. In fact, in the second period firms are more likely to collaborate with 
other firms in the same 3-digit sector, which means partners who can be considered 
quite similar to them. The categorical variable measuring sectoral heterogeneity is not 
included in models three and four because it largely overlaps with the definition of the 
nature of the agents involved in the dyads. As for the other types of heterogeneity, we 
observe that in the case of relationships between firms and other agents, heterogeneity 
– as measured by differences in capabilities for network management (leader) reduces 
the chances to form a new relationship in the consolidation stage. On the contrary, the 
difference in funds collected has a positive impact on the likelihood to form a 
relationship in the second period. The second aspect is easily understood if we 
consider that many of the firms that we observe are small. On average, incubators, 
technology parks, but also chambers of commerce and local governments (that are 
included in the category “other agents”) have participated in a larger number of 
networks and have collected a larger amount of funds than these SMEs. As for the 
first aspect, it is not surprising that firms with higher networking and leadership skills 
can be better able to establish connections with other agents. Therefore, relationships 
between firms and other agents that develop in the second period are likely to involve 
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agents that are heterogeneous in terms of funds collected, but which have similar 
leadership and networking capabilities. 
In general, co-location in the same province (often in the same cluster), has a positive 
impact on the possibility to form a new relationship in the second period. This does 
not apply in the case of university-industry collaborations, where geographical 
proximity may be less relevant than in other types of relationships, especially when it 
is measured at the level of individual province (see also Laursen et al, 2011).  
The presence of intermediaries brokering the relationship is of particular importance 
in the case of firm-to-university dyads. However, it is the brokering activity of a 
specialized intermediary (e.g. an innovation centre) that increases the probability to 
form a relationship in the network consolidation stage, while other “broader” 
intermediaries such as business associations or chambers of commerce (included in 
the variable other_interm) seem to play a negative role. This is possibly due to the 
fact that different types of intermediaries perform different types of tasks and pursue 
different goals. As discussed by Hassink (1996, 1997) specialized intermediaries may 
be effective in connecting firms to research centers because this is the specific task 
they focus on. Often, this task is facilitated by the fact that this type of intermediaries 
is controlled or participated by research centers. In contrast, intermediaries having a 
broader mission may not be useful for the purpose, because their resources are 
dispersed on many activities and on incouraging networking with a wide variety of 
agents
12
.  
Summarizing, the analysis shows that participation in the policy programmes 
considered somehow changed the firms’ relational patterns. In fact, having 
collaborated before the participation in the policy programmes did not affect the 
probability of having subsequent (policy-funded) collaborations. On the contrary, 
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having collaborated within the network formation stage did have a positive effect on 
the probability of new collaborations, and this is particularly true when the 
relationship was strong. This result seems to suggest that the observed policy 
programmes affected how firms chose their partners in innovative projects. At the 
same time, the programmes offered firms the opportunity to strengthen relationships 
over time. 
The peculiar characteristics of these policy programmes - the fact that they 
encouraged interactions with many diverse organisations in the network formation 
stage – may help to explain why sectoral heterogeneity had a negative effect on the 
probability to form relationships in the network consolidation stage: once the policy 
constraints were removed, firms resumed to cooperate with organisations that were 
most similar to them. This result may still indicate that learning had taken place: firms 
may have learned that heterogeneous relationships imposed by the policymakers were 
not particularly efficient or were not fulfilling their needs, and hence when the 
constraints were removed they sought out more effective partnerships. 
Focusing on intermediaries, we note that only some types of specialized 
intermediaries (innovation and technology transfer centres, incubators, science and 
technology parks) were able to play an effective bridging role between firms and 
universities. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this study we analysed empirically under what circumstances, for firms, the 
experience of having engaged in relationships with external organisations in the 
context of policy-supported networks can increase their likelihood to collaborate in 
the future. We did so by investigating the case of Tuscany, which can be considered  
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an old industrial region (as defined by Tödtling and Trippl, 2005), with its typical 
problems of lock-in and the need to bring SMEs closer to the world of research and 
technology transfer. In such regions, policies in support of innovation networks may 
facilitate the reconfiguration of innovative relations of the regional agents and the 
search for new complementarities.  
Although our dataset did not allow us to extend the analysis beyond the period of 
implementation of the policy interventions themselves nor to have a counterfactual 
analysis, we have observed the extent to which policy programmes with certain 
characteristics were able to promote firms’ engagement in subsequent relationships.  
We found that the participation in the policy programmes somehow changed the 
SMEs’ relational patterns, pushing them to collaborate – often in a stable way – with 
a variety of agents. In addition, we found that SMEs’ likelihood to form relationships 
with other organisations, including other SMEs, was influenced by certain features of 
their participation in the previous policy programmes: mutual involvement with 
certain kinds of intermediaries and previous collaborations, especially if repeated, 
increased the likelihood to collaborate, while heterogeneity in networking abilities 
had positive effects only in the case of relationships between SMEs and other agents. 
Sectoral heterogeneity had a negative effect on the probability to form relationships in 
the network consolidation stage: once the policy constraints were removed, firms 
resumed to cooperate with partners that were most similar to them, and who were 
presumably useful in achieving their innovation objectives. The results also highlight 
an interesting aspect of firm-university relationships, which policymakers in many 
European regions are very interested in supporting: only some types of intermediaries 
– those specialized in providing innovation-related services – were able to encourage 
  29 
the development of university-industry relationships. Co-location in the same 
province (often in the same cluster), increased the likelihood to collaborate. 
Therefore, we find that by imposing certain requirements on the characteristics of 
networks to be funded within a policy programme, policymakers could encourage the 
adoption of certain behaviours that are considered desirable, but only to a limited 
extent.  
Although these results have interesting policy implications, they do not tell us 
whether the observed changes in firms’ behaviour turned out to be long-lasting. It is 
on this last point that we want to focus our future research. Furthermore, our results 
can be used to design a counterfactual analysis in order to assess the policy impact of 
relational learning in the context of a regional innovation system. 
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1
 As it will be explained later in the section, the programmes were 4 and they were articulated in 9 
waves in total. However, here and in what follows we will use only the term programme both to refer 
to the programme and to refer to the specific wave. This choice is motivated by the fact that each of the 
9 waves was not merely a replica of the general framework set out in the programme, but it had its own 
peculiarities.  
2
 Bellandi and Caloffi (2010) included only a part of these projects, because the analysis was carried 
out in a period (2007) when the funds for the regional innovation policies seemed to be terminated.  
3
  The data refer to definitive projects, drafted in the format scheduled in the funding specifications. 
Our analysis includes all the subcontractors that have been explicitly identified in the application 
forms.  
4
 We have not considered as “potential relationships” all the relationships that might have developed 
between all participants in the same period (of network formation or consolidation), but we have 
restricted our observation to the participants in the same programme. We believe that the latter 
definition is the one that best fits the concept of a “truly” potential relationship, because it identifies a 
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relationship that involves organisations that have chosen to participate in the same period in the same 
policy programme (though not to the same project).  
5
 Relationships are bidirectional: if firm A participates in a project with organisation B, we have a 
unique link connecting both A with B and B with A. Multiple relationships, which can occur when two 
organisations meet in more than one programme (project) at the same stage of network formation or 
network consolidation, are not recorded as separate relationships (we do not generate a duplication of 
the record-dyad). As we will discuss in the following section, we consider the repeated co-participation 
as a specific feature of the observed dyad.  
6
 The organisations participating both in the first and in the second period are 205, but only 204 of 
them have at least one potential relationship with the same partner both in the first and in the second 
period (in other words: only 204 of them co-participate with the same organisation to the same 
programmes both in the first and in the second stage). 
7
 The authors have taken part in the evaluation of some of the programmes, namely the RPIA 
implemented in 2002, the programme 171_2005, and the RPIA launched in 2006. Moreover, they have 
had access to all the administrative data (evaluation reports, project reports, information on 
participants) collected by the Region.  
8
 We have obtained this information thanks to the interviews to the participants that we have performed 
during the evaluation of the different programmes. In particular, we have asked the participants 
whether the relation with each project partner was initiated thanks to the policies or was pre-existing.  
9 
Out of the 5,903 dyads for which we have complete information, 1,121 are formed by pairs of firms, 
1,085 are formed by pairs that include a firm and a university, while the remaining 3,697 are firm-other 
agents pairs. 
10
 We have run some post-estimation tests that have allowed us to assess the models’ goodness-of-fit, 
and to exclude the presence of multicollinearity. 
11
 In particular, in the case of firm-to-firm and firm-to-university dyads, the organisations that have 
multiple relations in the network formation stage, always continue to collaborate in the second period. 
In these dyads, the variable multiple exactly predict success: this is why we have excluded it from the 
analysis, as explained in the note to table 5.    
12
 Obviously, there is a wider range of variables that can have an impact on the effectiveness of 
intermediaries. We refer to Hassink (1996, 1997) and Howells (2006) for a more detailed discussion of 
this point. 
